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A B S T R A C T   
Agglomeration bonus schemes have become important policy tools when the environmental benefit hinges on 
spatial coordination of conservation sites. We here analyse how spatial factors affect the uptake of an agglom-
eration payment scheme in a Swiss mountain region, which seeks to establish a network of conservation areas to 
conserve favourable conditions for biodiversity. We use a combination of spatially explicit farm census (44,279 
parcels) and survey data in a spatially lagged explanatory variable model. In addition, we also consider the 
collaborative process in establishing the eligibility of parcels for receiving the bonus payment. We find that 
parcels that are more distant from the farm as well as those at steeper slopes are more likely to enter the scheme. 
This implies that conservation costs are an important driver of the farmers’ decisions. The results remain robust 
when controlling for a wide range of parcel, farm and farmers’ characteristics. The analysis also showed that the 
collaborative process increased the enrolment of parcels cultivated by larger farmers managing their land more 
intensively. We conclude that the collaborative process increased the weight given to biodiversity from con-
necting conservation sites in the planning process of the agglomeration bonus scheme.   
1. Introduction 
Agri-environmental policy schemes usually rely on measures at the 
farm-level, ranging from regulatory instruments such as input standards 
to economic instruments including subsidies (DeBoe, 2020). While some 
biodiversity conservation targets can be addressed locally at farm-levels, 
others require spatial coordination and cooperation at landscape scales 
to be effective. Examples for the latter are biospheres, or habitats for 
seasonally migrating amphibians, or specialist butterflies and birds 
(Brückmann et al., 2010; Franks, 2011; Goldman et al., 2007; Morelli 
et al., 2017; Sayer et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2007; Zingg et al., 2019). 
When spatial coordination of conservation sites matters, implementing 
instruments on individual farms in a piece-meal fashion is likely to limit 
their effectiveness (e.g. Kuhfuss et al., 2019; Manning et al., 2018). In 
this context, agglomeration bonus payments have been suggested as a 
useful instrument to support landscape scale biodiversity conservation 
(Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; Parkhurst et al., 2002). 
We here analyse how spatial factors related to farmers’ opportunity 
costs affect the uptake of an agglomeration payment scheme in a Swiss 
mountain region. To this end, we combine spatially explicit farm census 
data and survey data on farmers’ environmental awareness in a spatial 
econometric approach to assess the effect of spatial characteristics and 
non-spatial factors on the uptake of the scheme. 
Previous research has shown that agri-environmental schemes are 
often ineffective because individual farms implement a specific scheme, 
while the ecological benefit should emerge on the landscape scale (e.g. 
Kuhfuss et al., 2019; Manning et al., 2018). Thus, spatially coordinating 
adoption of agri-environmental schemes could enhance the ecological 
value on a landscape level (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2013; Tscharntke et al., 
2012; Westerink et al., 2017). To achieve this coordination, agglomer-
ation bonus payments are offered to the adopter of an agri- 
environmental scheme if sufficient spatially proximate land parcels 
are enrolled in the same scheme (e.g. Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; 
Parkhurst et al., 2002; Wätzold and Drechsler, 2014). This allows to 
reduce the fragmentation of conservation sites and increase the proba-
bility of species movement across habitats and thus support landscape- 
moderated biodiversity patterns and processes (e.g., movement of sub-
populations between or species exploitation of resources from different 
habitat patches; see Tscharntke et al., 2012). Theoretical and experi-
mental research has shown that the success of such schemes in general 
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depends on farmers’ individual characteristics, on field and farm char-
acteristics, social norms and on the specific design of the instrument 
(Bell et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2009; Drechsler et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 
2011; Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; Vaissière et al., 2018; Wätzold and 
Drechsler, 2014; Westerink et al., 2017). While the insights of these 
studies provide an important background for the design of agglomera-
tion payment schemes, empirical assessments of such schemes are still 
rare (Krämer and Wätzold, 2018; Shimada, 2020; Toderi et al., 2017). In 
addition, agglomeration bonus payments are usually implemented via a 
collaborative process and depend critically on the level of coordination 
between the farmers and other stakeholders (e.g. Banerjee et al., 2017; 
Drechsler, 2017; Kuhfuss et al., 2016). Thus, spatial factors influence the 
uptake of an agglomeration bonus payment on two levels: Firstly, in the 
collaborative planning process that defines the area eligible in the 
scheme and, secondly, in the farmers’ decision regarding which parcels 
to actually enrol in the agglomeration bonus scheme. To our knowledge, 
there is so far no empirical research that addresses this twofold role of 
spatial factors in the adoption of an agglomeration bonus scheme. 
To address this research gap, we analyse an existing agglomeration 
bonus scheme in Switzerland. In this scheme, farmers receive an addi-
tional payment if they enrol land in a biodiversity conservation scheme 
based on a project plan that spatially coordinates the allocation of par-
cels to support biodiversity on a landscape scale. We combine parcel 
characteristics (number of parcels n = 44,279) such as the parcels’ size, 
steepness and the distance to the farm, with farm characteristics such as 
farm size, land-use intensity and part-time farming and farmers’ char-
acteristics such as age and environmental awareness as well as spatial 
information of parcel eligibility in agglomeration projects. This broad 
set of environmental and socio-economic data allows us to account for 
the twofold role of spatial characteristics in agglomeration bonus 
schemes (i.e., their influence in the planning process and the actual 
enrolment on the farm level). We compare different spatially lagged 
explanatory variable models to assess the robustness of our results to a 
wide range of specifications. Our results extend existing research by an 
empirical estimation of the importance of spatial parcel characteristics 
in the development and adoption of agglomeration bonus payments in a 
multifunctional and heterogeneous landscape. 
Our results show that the agglomeration bonus scheme increased the 
connectivity between biodiversity conservation areas in our case study 
region and thus effectively created a network of conservation areas. We 
also find that parcels that are more distant from the farm (i.e., the 
farmstead) as well as those at steeper slopes are more likely to enter the 
scheme. This implies that farmers’ management costs are an important 
driver of the farmers’ decision on which parcel to enrol in an agglom-
eration scheme. This result remains robust independent of whether we 
consider the collaborative process or not. With respect to the process, 
our analysis also showed that the collaborative planning increased the 
enrolment of parcels cultivated by larger farmers managing their land 
more intensively. This provides an important basis for the further 
development and implementation of agglomeration bonus schemes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next 
section, we introduce the agglomeration bonus scheme in Switzerland. 
In Section 3, we first outline our conceptual model and then present our 
empirical estimation strategy. We present the case study region and data 
in Section 4. The results of our regression analysis are presented in 
Section 5. We discuss our results in the last section and conclude with 
policy implications of our study. 
2. Policy Background 
Agglomeration bonus payments are a policy option for agri- 
environmental programs that aim to create a spatially contiguous 
network of conservation sites. Farmers receive a bonus payment on top 
of the regular area payment if they designate land for conservation that 
is in close proximity to neighbours’ conservation areas. In Switzerland, 
the government supports biodiversity conservation via a policy program 
called biodiversity promotion areas1 that combines a payment for con-
servation habitats with an agglomeration bonus scheme (Mack et al., 
2020). The underlying payment is an input-oriented agri-environmental 
scheme (i.e., farmers get a payment for managing land according to a 
specified practice that promotes biodiversity conservation). For 
example, a farmer gets a payment for a low intensive use of hay 
meadows. This means that a farmer is not allowed to cut the grass before 
June 15th (after date of flowering) nor to use fertilization on his 
grassland. On top of this payment, farmers get a bonus payment if they 
spatially coordinate the allocation of these biodiversity conservation 
area enrolled in the input-oriented scheme. The overall goal of the Swiss 
agglomeration bonus payment is to establish a network of conservation 
areas to conserve and foster favourable conditions for the distribution of 
flora and fauna species (BLW, 2015). Within the perimeter of an 
agglomeration project, farmers can sign a contract in which they commit 
to integrate their biodiversity promotion areas into a spatial conserva-
tion network. In exchange, they receive an agglomeration bonus. Since 
2001, the total area included in the spatial conservation networks in 
Switzerland has steadily increased and covers almost 80% of the 
biodiversity promotion areas in 2018 (BLW, 2020). 
To receive agglomeration bonus payments, farmers need to collab-
orate in a so-called agglomeration project that defines parcels’ eligi-
bility. Who is involved in defining the project can vary. Some projects 
are rather farmer driven while others were developed through collab-
orative planning involving farmers, members of the local communities, 
farm advisors and usually members of ecological planning firms (Jenny 
et al., 2018; Krämer and Wätzold, 2018). In either case, the project 
perimeter, its goals (e.g., a sufficiently large target area and the eligible 
measures funded in the project) need to be defined. The Federal Office 
for Agriculture has to approve all projects according to minimal stan-
dards for a set of objective indicators. Farmers must sign a contract in 
which they ensure the corresponding management for at least eight 
years. 
While the project perimeter and the eligible measures are defined in 
the description of the agglomeration project, farmers are free to decide 
which parcels they actually enrol in the agglomeration bonus scheme. 
To enrol land for the agglomeration bonus, it is not necessary that parcel 
borders of biodiversity promotion areas are adjacent. It is rather key that 
a parcel is located in a surrounding with other suited parcels and or 
natural elements (forests, water bodies, etc.). This means that the gen-
eral characteristics of proximate parcels are more important than the 
enrolment of a single, neighbouring parcel. 
3. Method 
3.1. Conceptual Model 
We build on a model developed by Wätzold and Drechsler (2014) as 
conceptual background and to derive our hypotheses. A farmer will 
enrol a parcel, i, into a conservation network if the utility of doing so, πi, 
is positive. Assume conservation cost is a function, αi(X), that depends 
on a vector of farmer, farm and parcel characteristics, X, with elements 
x1, …, xn. In a first stage, the farmer receives an input-oriented payment 
p, for enrolling the parcel in a conservation scheme. The additional 
agglomeration bonus is q. The utility function is then given by: 
πi = p − αi(X)+ qφi(β(bi, di,αi(X) ) ) (1) 
The farmer receives the agglomeration bonus payment if the parcel is 
eligible for and enrolled in an agglomeration project (i.e., when the 
indicator function φi(∙) = 1). The eligibility function is given by β(∙), 
which depends on specific biodiversity levels, bi, the proximity to other 
1 In Switzerland these schemes are called Biodiversitätsbeiträge (in German), 
Contributions à la biodiversité (in French), Contributi per la biodiversita (in 
Italian), contribuziuns da biodiversitad (Rumantsch). 
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conservation parcels, di, and conservation costs, αi(X). For further 
specification of the eligibility function, an additive multi-attribute value 
function approach could be used, that assigns value functions and 
weights to each of the attributes biodiversity, distance and cost (Eisen-
führ et al., 2009). (More detail on this specification approach is provided 
in Appendix A.) The conceptual model reflects the twofold role of spatial 
characteristics in the uptake of the agglomeration bonus scheme. On the 
one hand, spatial characteristics directly affect the farmers’ conserva-
tions costs αi(X). While on the other hand, the spatial characteristics 
affect the eligibility function φi(∙). 
To develop hypotheses on our key question, the effect of farm and 















Eq. (2) reveals that the marginal effect of a characteristic on con-
servation cost is reinforced by the marginal effect of the characteristic on 
the eligibility function. For example, take slope as parcel characteristic. 
The first term on the right-hand side (i.e., the marginal change of con-
servation costs) becomes negative if conservation cost decreases with 
increasing slope of terrain. By intuition this is due to lower opportunity 
cost in steep terrain. Considering the negative sign of the marginal cost 
changes, the effect on total utility becomes positive when slope in-
creases. The second term reinforces this effect because eligibility will 
decrease with increasing marginal conservation cost. This is plausible 
because conservation efforts need to consider cost-effectiveness and, 
ceteris paribus, will target the least-cost selection of parcels. 
The marginal effects of distance (Eq. (3)) and biodiversity values (Eq. 

















Given that spatial connectivity is key in an agglomeration bonus 
scheme, we expect that the eligibility function prioritizes parcels with 
small distance to other conservation parcels, so that ∂β∂di < 0 and hence 
the overall marginal effect of distance between parcels on utility is 
negative. For biodiversity values we expect the opposite (i.e., a priori-
tization of high biodiversity values in the eligibility function), so that 
∂β
∂bi
> 0, and thus an overall positive marginal effect of biodiversity values 
on utility. 
In a further specification of the eligibility function, e.g., as an addi-
tive multi-attribute value function, weights can be assigned to the 
different attributes (i.e., biodiversity, distance, and the conservation 
costs). We expect that if farmers specify and assign the weights on their 
own, they will give conservation costs comparatively more weight than 
biodiversity and distance. In the case in which it is done in a collabo-
rative manner by farmers and conservation experts, we expect that 
biodiversity and proximity of conservation areas receive more, or at 
least equal, weight as conservation costs. 
3.2. Econometric Framework 
In our empirical analysis, we aim to identify factors determining 
whether the parcel is in the agglomeration project (y = 1) or not (y = 0). 
To this end, we estimate variations of the following core model: 
y = Xpβp +Xnβn +WXiθ+ ε (5)  
where the parcel’s characteristics Xp, farm and farmer characteristics Xn 
as well as the participation of proximate parcels with WXi are consid-
ered and ε is an error term. Parcel characteristics and farm level fixed 
effects represent conservation costs αi(X). For the representation of the 
collaborative development of the agglomeration project, we use 
different specifications of the core model. The key challenge in our 
analysis is that the weightings in the eligibility function are not 
observable in our data. This means that we do not have information 
about the collective negotiations when defining the project perimeter. 
Parcels could be attributed to the agglomeration project only consid-
ering their suitability for enhancing biodiversity or considering only 
conservation costs or a mixture of both. This might create a selection 
bias in the agglomeration project. For example, the eligibility of parcels 
to be included in the agglomeration project could rely on conservation 
costs if only farmers are involved in this process. Such a selection bias 
would imply that only parcels with low opportunity costs enter the 
eligibility function. Moreover, other observables and unobservables may 
bias inference on enrolment determinants, e.g. characteristics of the 
decision maker. 
To address this potential endogeneity of the parcel characteristics 
and the conservation reserve, we estimate different variations of the 
above model. We show the robustness of our key results to a wide range 
of specifications. In the first model, we assume that all parcels in the case 
study area are eligible for the agglomeration bonus payment but are 
more likely to be enrolled in the program with higher shares of proxi-
mate parcels that had already been enrolled in the input-oriented pay-
ment for biodiversity promotion areas p (Model 1). For this, we use a 
spatially lagged form of the conservation practice as explanatory vari-
able (SLX model). This counterfactual approach implies that the weights 
in the eligibility function are solely put on conservation costs, con-
strained only by the proximity of already existing conservation areas. To 
account for the different parcel densities in the study region, we specify 
W as a binary k-nearest neighbour matrix. Here we chose k = 5 proxi-
mate parcels reflecting an average number of neighbouring parcels. 
Sensitivity results from relaxing this assumption are presented in Ap-
pendix B. We use WXi as a control variable and expect the model to be 
robust to other numbers of k (LeSage and Pace, 2010; LeSage and Pace, 
2014). We did not weight the neighbourhood matrix with the physical 
distance between parcels and only considered adjacent parcels. The 
reason is that larger parcels or natural elements between parcels (such as 
a mountain creek) would have influenced the weight of these parcels in 
the matrix even though there would be no relevant impact from a 
biodiversity perspective. 
We extend our base specification (Model 1) by adding dummies for 
each individual agglomeration project developed in our case study re-
gion (Model 2). This accounts for the shared environment of these 
parcels, which increases the likelihood that the observations are not 
independent in space and that the error term is thus spatially correlated 
(e.g. Cliff and Ord, 1970). Therefore, we aim to reduce potential bias for 
omitted spatially correlated variables. We follow Storm and Heckelei 
(2018) and control not only for the participation of proximate parcels in 
a conservation program WXi but also for spatially correlated errors on a 
higher spatial level (i.e., we control for the agglomeration projects 
associated with a parcel). Next, we also account for socio-economic 
variables, such as age and environmental awareness that might influ-
ence the utility from enrolling parcels into the agglomeration bonus 
scheme (Model 3). The sample size is however reduced for this specifi-
cation because of missing data. 
Finally, we chose a project centred approach (Model 4) and use only 
parcels that are effectively part of the agglomeration project. This means 
that we use the maps resulting from the collaboration between the 
farmers and the conservation experts which defined a conservation 
network plan specifying the actual eligibility of parcels (i.e., that belong 
to β(∙)). We do not have to control for spatial lags in this model since the 
plan defines the range of parcels that a farmer can choose to enrol in the 
agglomeration bonus scheme. Please note that more parcels are eligible 
than actually enrolled. Due to data limitations, this second approach 
focuses on one agglomeration project in our case study region and thus 
represents only a sub-set of the full data. 
The comparison of these two approaches allows for a robust and 
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meaningful assessment of the role of αi(X) even if the true weightings for 
biodiversity from connecting conservation sites, distance and conser-
vation costs in the eligibility function β(∙) are unobservable. The R code 
used in our study is presented in the online Appendix C. 
4. Case Study Region, Control Variables and Data 
4.1. Case Study Region 
This study focuses on the Saas and Matter valleys in the Canton of 
Valais, Switzerland. These steep V-shaped valleys are surrounded by a 
series of peaks higher than 4000 m elevation, isolating them east-west, 
as well as towards the south from Italy (Fig. 1). This typical European 
mountain region is characterized by a continental, inner-Alpine climate 
with moderate temperatures and comparably low precipitation 
(Brändle, 2019). The case study region can be seen as an exemplary case 
for small-scaled and diverse farming practices in a heterogeneous and 
multifunctional landscape of high biodiversity conservation potential 
(Huber et al., 2013). 
According to the census data in 2016, there were 464 farms regis-
tered in the area, of which 73% participate in an agglomeration project. 
On average, farmers in the region currently cultivate less than 10 ha of 
agricultural land and house around seven livestock units. The main 
farming activity is the production of livestock based on grassland. There 
are only a few hectares of crops at the bottom of the valley. Part-time 
farming based on small livestock has become a widespread activity 
and regional tradition. The census dataset contains information about 
land use of each of the 44,279 parcels of farms in the case study region. 
27% of the parcels are part of an agglomeration project. Fig. 1 gives an 
overview of the location of the parcels in the dataset, the parcels 
included in the scheme and the associated agglomeration projects as 
designed by the canton of Valais. 
4.2. Variables 
We use a set of farmer, farm and parcel characteristics to assess the 
role of conservation costs in agglomeration payment schemes. In line 
with our conceptual model, we present these factors in three groups: 
factors affecting profits, additional factors affecting farmers’ participa-
tion decisions, and suitability for biodiversity conservation. 
Plots’ productivity is a key variable affecting profits. Low 
productivity has been associated to higher program uptake in France 
(Calvet et al., 2019). This is consistent with results of a pan-European 
analysis that show that location in less favourable farming areas in-
creases the probability for program participation (Zimmermann and 
Britz, 2016). For the specific case of Switzerland, this association has 
been made with certain mountain zones that are defined by factors 
including slope and vegetation period (Mack et al., 2020). Apart from 
productivity, farm size and working time spent on the farm affect profits. 
Farm size is often measured in terms of area or gross margin. The pan- 
European study using gross margin as indicator for size finds a posi-
tive effect of size on the likelihood of participation in an agri- 
environmental policy (Zimmermann and Britz, 2016). Studies using 
area as indicator have revealed mixed results. Some, inter alia from 
Switzerland, find a positive effect (Cullen et al., 2020; Mack et al., 2020; 
Pavlis et al., 2016; Ruto and Garrod, 2009) while others have found a 
negative effect (Defrancesco et al., 2008). However, it is important to 
keep in mind that there is substantial variation across European coun-
tries in what is considered large which can limit the transferability of 
results. Farmers working part-time on their farms have often been found 
to be more likely to participate in agri-environmental programs (Lastra- 
Bravo et al., 2015; Mack et al., 2020). Explanations provided in the 
literature are that due to income diversification, they are less dependent 
on maximizing revenue on all of their agricultural area and they may be 
more capable of coping with the risks of uncertain environmental 
outcomes. 
Next to profits, many other socio-economic factors, such as farmers’ 
age and environmental awareness can impact participation decisions. 
While age is often found to be negatively associated with agri- 
environmental program participation (Zimmermann and Britz, 2016; 
Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015), there are also contrary examples (Defrancesco 
et al., 2008). In some studies, environmental awareness has proven to 
increase the likelihood of program uptake, while in others there was no 
significant effect (Cullen et al., 2020; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Mette-
penningen et al., 2013). Related to parcels, Calvet et al. (2019) find that 
pre-program conformity with program requirements and ease of 
implementation of required measures positively affected program 
uptake. 
When farmers can individually decide which parcels to enrol in an 
agri-environmental program, their own assessment of biodiversity con-
servation suitability indeed plays a role (Cullen et al. 2020). Farmers 
naturally have in-depth knowledge of their parcels but identifying 
biodiversity at a regional scale can be intricate. Biodiversity levels 
typically are the result of complex relationships between various biotic, 
abiotic and land management factors. Relating to land management, 
management intensity has been found to be associated with species 
composition in Swiss sub-alpine regions. For example, meadows in agri- 
environmental schemes, which are subject to a late first cut and no or 
limited fertilising contribute to species richness (Kampmann et al., 
2008). In contrast, more intensively managed grasslands (i.e., fertilized 
grassland with multiple cuts or a high stocking density) tend to have 
fewer species (Le Clec’h et al., 2019; Peter et al., 2008). For Swiss alpine 
summer pastures, livestock density was found to be negatively associ-
ated with biodiversity levels (Zabel, 2019). At the European scale, 
stocking density was found to negatively impact farmers’ decisions to 
participate in agri-environmental programs (Zimmermann and Britz, 
2016). 
4.3. Data 
We here combine data from three sources (see also Table 1): 1) farm 
census data from all farms in the case study region in 2011 and 20162 
including information on spatially explicit parcel characteristics and 
Fig. 1. Overview of the study region including eight agglomeration projects 
(AP) and the associated parcels. Black parcels are not enrolled in the Swiss 
biodiversity conservation program BFF (Data sources: Brändle, 2019 
and Swisstopo). 
2 Please note that the agglomeration projects in our case study region were 
established before 2016. 
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land-use type of 44,279 parcels (Brändle, 2019); 2) Spatially explicit 
information on effective parcel eligibility for the payment in one of the 
agglomeration bonus schemes in the perimeter for the agglomeration 
project AP 2 in the region Mattertal (Landplan 2016); 3) Survey data 
from before the launch of the agglomeration bonus program to consider 
farmers’ individual characteristics such as age and environmental 
awareness (Brändle et al., 2015). 
The survey data were collected between October 2011 to January 
2012. We conducted both a mail survey (n = 111 i.e., 25% of all farms in 
the region) and 15 semi-structured interviews to collect data on farming 
objectives and farmer attitudes, for example on extensive land-uses. 
Data on attitudes was collected on five-point Likert scales. The envi-
ronmental awareness variable used in this study results from the mean of 
five survey questions related to environmental awareness. 1) The 
importance of promoting and protecting biodiversity with agricultural 
activities, 2) the perception of biodiversity loss, 3) the satisfaction with 
the level of biodiversity on own fields, 4) their perceived impact on 
biodiversity and 5) whether they would promote biodiversity also 
without legal obligation (see Brändle et al., 2015 for details). The benefit 
of this variable is that it was collected before the implementation of the 
agglomeration bonus scheme. Thus, it is not affected by the collabora-
tive planning process that might have influenced famers’ environmental 
awareness. 
The survey data were subsequently linked to agricultural farm census 
data. This resulted in a sub-set of the data that extended the available 
farm individual census data with farmer specific variables. We used 
information on the size of the parcel, the distance between parcel and 
farm as well as the mean parcel slope as characteristics of the parcels 
that affect farmers’ conservation costs. For each farm, the data provided 
information about farm size in hectares, the type and number of animals, 
whether it was a full- or part-time farm enterprise and farmers’ age. To 
meet the assumption of normally distributed error terms, we log- or 
square root transformed some of the variables. The variable Intensity 
results from a factor analysis of variables related to animal husbandry 
including the type of animals such as the number of cows, goats or 
sheep. The variable distinguishes between intensive cattle farms, 
extensive sheep farms and mixed cattle and sheep farms. Distance Farm- 
Parcel is the line between the parcel and the farm, calculated from their 
respective coordinates. Finally, we calculated a variable (Biodiversity 
promotion areas in neighbourhood) that reflects the distance between 
the parcels enrolled in an agri-environmental scheme before the creation 
of the agglomeration project plans. This variable is the weighted average 
of parcels in the agglomeration project among the k = 5 neighbours of 
each parcel. 
5. Results 
We find that the proximity to parcels already enrolled in a biodi-
versity conservation scheme is positively associated with enrolment in 
the agglomeration scheme. This implies that the agglomeration project 
in fact created a network between existing conservation areas. Con-
trolling for spatially correlated errors on a higher spatial level in Model 2 
did not affect magnitude and significance of coefficient estimates. 
We also find a positive association between parcel characteristics and 
enrolment in the agglomeration project program in all four estimated 
models (Table 2). This implies that parcels that are more distant from 
the farm and parcels in steeper terrain are more likely to be enrolled in 
the agglomeration payment scheme. More distant and steeper parcels 
usually have higher cultivation and thus lower conservation costs. This 
suggest that farmers’ opportunity costs are an important driver in the 
decision which parcels to enrol in such a program. In addition, parcels 
belonging to a larger farm are also more likely to be enrolled in the 
program in all four models. 
The key finding of our analysis is that the importance of conservation 
costs remains stable across all model specifications. This suggests that 
our estimation of the effect of spatial parcel characteristics on the uptake 
of an agglomeration scheme is robust independent of whether we 
considered the distance between parcels already enrolled in an agri- 
environmental scheme as eligibility criteria (models 1–3) or whether 
we considered the actual eligibility in the project (model 4). The effect of 
Table 1 
Description of variables.   
Description Used in model* Unit Min Max Mean 
1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable  
Parcel is enrolled in agglomeration project (=1) or not (=0)     0/1 0 1 0.27  
Independent variable 





Distance Farm –Parcel: Log distance between parcel and farm x x x x m (km) 0 (0.4) 10.17 
(26.12) 
6.89 (1.78) 
Parcel slope: Square root of the mean parcel slope x x x x degree 0 (1.5) 8.33 
(38.5) 
4.45 (20.8) 
Area: control for participation 
of other parcels in the area 
Biodiversity promotion areas in the neighbourhood: Share of 
proximate parcels (N = 5) enrolled in an agri-environmental 
scheme 
x x x  0/1 0 5 2.16 
Associated agglomeration project  x   Dummy 
variable (1–8)    
Farm control variables Farm size: Log effective agricultural area of farm x x x x ha 0.1 (0.3) 4.31 
(74.7) 
2.45 (15.5) 
Intensity: Factor for intensity of cattle farming x x x x Factor 
(Livestock 
units) 
0 (0) 11.9 
(181) 
0.44 (14.57) 
Part-time farming: Full time (=0) or part time (=1) farmer x x x x 0/1   1: 28,657 / 
0: 18,563 
Environmental Awareness: Farmers’ environmental 
awareness   
x  Factor (1–5) 2.6 5 3.97 
Age of the farmer in 2016   x  years 25 64 47.11  
* Model 1: Econometric model with spatially lagged form of the conservation practice as explanatory variable using all parcel data; Model 2: Spatially lagged 
econometric model (as Model 1) including spatially correlated errors on a higher spatial level (i.e., the project level) using all parcel data; Model 3: Model 1 including 
survey data (i.e., subset of parcel data for all farms that responded to the survey); Model 4: Econometric model with only eligible parcels but without spatially lagged 
explanatory variable (i.e., subset of parcel data for the agglomeration project 2). Full summary statistics is presented in the online Appendix C. 
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the parcels’ mean slope even increases when considering only parcels 
that are actually eligible in the agglomeration project (Fig. 2). Thus, the 
weight of the conservation costs in the choice which parcel to enrol 
becomes even more important. 
With respect to the role of the collaborative process in the agglom-
eration project, we find two opposite effects. On the one hand, we find 
that in our models 1 and 2, the size of the parcel is positively associated 
with enrolment in the agglomeration scheme. In the fourth model, the 
coefficient for the size of the parcel is negative and insignificant, 
implying that through the negotiation of the agglomeration project, 
larger parcels are not given particular preference in determining the 
project perimeter. On the other hand, the comparison between models 
that consider all parcels to be eligible (i.e., models 1–3) with the model 
that considers the actual project perimeter (model 4) also reveals that 
the negotiations of the agglomeration project might have increased the 
weight given to biodiversity from connecting conservation sites in the 
definition of the perimeter. This is implied by the result that the farms’ 
intensity is negatively associated with the parcels membership in the 
agglomeration scheme when assuming all parcels would be eligible. This 
association is no longer significant in model 4. Thus, our results suggest 
that the negotiation process might have increased the pressure on farms 
with high cattle intensity to enrol parcels into the agglomeration 
scheme. In addition, the weight of the farm size also increased in the 
case that we only considered the eligible parcels (Model 4). This implies 
that larger farms became even more likely to enrol land into the 
agglomeration bonus scheme. 
The consideration of regional dummy variables in Model 2 showed 
that there might be omitted spatially correlated variables that differ-
entiate the agglomeration projects (see online Appendix). However, 
they had no influence on our main estimates. Including the socio- 
economic control variables part-time farming, age and environmental 
awareness in our Model 3 did not impact the estimates of the parcel 
Table 2 
Estimation results and comparison of models.   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept − 9.124 *** − 8.880 *** − 9.467 *** − 11.034 *** 
(0.383)  (0.401)  (1.403)  (1.014)  
Farm size 1.067 *** 1.002 *** 0.864 ** 1.993 *** 
(0.162)  (0.160)  (0.291)  (0.412)  
Intensity − 0.364 *** − 0.328 ** − 0.174  − 0.427  
(0.111)  (0.110)  (0.171)  (0.542)  
Part-time farming − 0.158  − 0.140  − 0.524  − 1.035  
(0.224)  (0.223)  (0.382)  (0.662)  
Parcel size 0.067 *** 0.068 *** − 0.021  − 0.067 . 
(0.015)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.041)  
Distance farm - parcel 0.166 *** 0.165 *** 0.181 *** 0.223 *** 
(0.021)  (0.021)  (0.037)  (0.048)  
Parcel slope 0.251 *** 0.254 *** 0.248 *** 0.971 *** 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.044)  
Biodiversity promotion area in neighbourhood 0.870 *** 0.868 *** 0.884 ***   
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.021)    
Environmental awareness     0.324 .       
(0.238)    
Age     0.010        
(0.015)    
Associated agglomeration project   Yes      
Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001; ‘**’ 0.01; ‘*’ 0.05; ‘.’ 0.1. Standard Errors in brackets. Estimates of dummy variables in Model 2 are shown in the online Appendix (C). 
Fig. 2. Average marginal effects (AME) of parcel, neighbourhood and farm factors in models (BFF = Biodiversity promotion area in neighbourhood).  
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characteristics. Our results suggest that farmers with a more environ-
mentally friendly attitude are more likely to enrol their parcels in the 
agglomeration scheme. This effect, however, is not significant at the 5% 
level which implies that also farmers that stated to be less concerned 
about the environment enrolled their parcels in the scheme. We found 
no association between enrolment and part-time farming as well as age. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Agri-environmental schemes are key instruments for biodiversity 
conservation. These schemes are usually implemented at the farm level 
whereas the environmental benefit e.g. of biodiversity, emerges on the 
landscape scale (Tscharntke et al., 2012). Thus, a growing body of 
literature is dealing with novel instrument designs that incorporate 
spatial coordination and landscape scale cooperation (e.g. Engel, 2016). 
We here assessed the role of spatial characteristics related to farmers’ 
opportunity costs to the uptake of an agglomeration payment scheme in 
Switzerland. This scheme is based on a collaborative development of an 
agglomeration project involving farmers, members of the local com-
munities, farm advisors and usually members of ecological planning 
firms. Based on the collaboratively developed plan, farmers can choose 
to enrol land in the scheme and receive a payment for low intensive 
management and an additional bonus for the contribution to a network 
of conservation areas. 
Our results show that the collaborative agglomeration projects lead 
to a higher connectivity between the biodiversity conservation areas in 
our case study region and we find that parcels that are more distant from 
the farm as well as those at steeper slopes are more likely to enter the 
agglomeration scheme. Such a network of conservation areas is sup-
posed to foster favourable conditions for the distribution of flora and 
fauna species (e.g., to increase the movement of subpopulation between 
habitat patches or to allow species to exploit resources from different 
habitats). 
Our result holds independent of our estimation approach and implies 
that farmers’ opportunity costs are an important driver of the farmers’ 
decision which parcel to enrol in an agglomeration scheme. This is also 
in line with research on farmers motivation to enter agri-environmental 
schemes in general (e.g., Van Herzele et al., 2013). However, we are 
aware that also other behavioural factors such as cultural identity affect 
farmers decision to enrol a certain parcel into an agri-environmental 
scheme (Burton et al., 2020). 
The differences between our counterfactual approach in which all 
parcels are potentially eligible and the approach in which only parcels in 
the network plan are eligible suggests that the collaborative process 
increased the likelihood that also larger farms with higher cattle in-
tensity enrol land in the scheme. In contrast, the probability that larger 
parcels enter the scheme decreased. This proposes that the collaborative 
process had a corrective role towards more weight for the expected 
biodiversity from connecting biodiversity promotion areas compared to 
conservation costs. In this context, Krämer and Wätzold (2018) who 
qualitatively assessed three case studies of the agglomeration bonus in 
Switzerland concluded that the involvement of farmers in the manage-
ment of agglomeration projects is a crucial component in increasing the 
quality of conservation areas. At the same time, another qualitative 
evaluation of the agglomeration bonus payment in Switzerland revealed 
that farmers often dominate the development of project perimeters and 
eligible measures (Jenny et al., 2018). Our empirical analysis confirms 
this ambivalent impact of the collaborative process on the successful 
implementation of agglomeration bonus payments in Switzerland. 
Regarding policy, our results suggest that the collaborative devel-
opment of agglomeration projects is beneficial to increase the weight 
given to biodiversity from connecting conservation sites in the planning 
process of bonus payment schemes. Without the input of local commu-
nities, farm advisors and usually members of ecological planning firms, 
farmers’ conservation costs are the dominant factor in the choice of 
enrolling a parcel in the scheme. Thus, policy makers should try to in-
crease the weight of biodiversity aspects in the collaborative spatial 
planning processes of agglomeration bonus payments. In addition, 
tailoring the bonus payment to the effective conservation costs in space 
(i.e., differentiate the bonus depending on the spatial characteristics of 
the parcel) could increase the efficiency of the scheme (e.g. Banerjee, 
2018). 
Further research could combine our analysis with more information 
about the negotiation process such as power relations in the negotia-
tions, changes in environmental awareness, and the role of social norms 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Toderi et al., 2017; Westerink et al., 2017). This 
would help to assess the external validity of our conceptual model and 
approach. In addition, the inclusion of data on the effective change of 
flora and fauna species would be an important next step to be able to 
assess also the additional effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme 
compared to other instruments supporting biodiversity in agricultural 
landscapes. Using more recent data could also help to identify mid and 
long-term effects of the agglomeration bonus scheme including spillover 
and leakage effects. Finally, we also acknowledge that our cases study 
region is specific to inner Alpine mountain regions. The region is a 
biodiversity hotspot and exhibits a large environmental heterogeneity 
creating also a high variability in conservation costs. The generalization 
of our results to regions with lower heterogeneity and different socio- 
economic environments is not straightforward. Thus, the application 
of the conceptual model and our empirical approach should be extended 
also to other regions to scale the knowledge about underlying factors 
that drive the enrolment of land into the agglomeration bonus scheme. 
This could provide important insights on how agri-environmental 
schemes can create environmental benefits on a landscape scale. 
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Appendix A. Appendix 
The eligibility function can be specified as an additive multi-attribute value function (Eisenführ et al., 2009): 
β(X) = wbβb(bi)+wdβd(di)+wαβα(α(xi) )
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which assigns a value to each parcel, X, in the project perimeter. Each parcel is characterized by a vector bi, di, x1, …, xn indicating the levels of the 
relevant attributes, bi, for biodiversity, di, for distance and x1, …, xnfor cost. A normalized value function is assigned to each attribute: for biodiversity 
βb(), for distance βd(), and for cost βα(). In the model, the value function is determined either by the farmers in the project perimeter or in the more 
collaborative approach by the farmers together with other stakeholders. They also assign the weights which are given by wb, wd, wα, with wb + wd + wα 
= 1. 
We argue that the mutual preferential independence and difference independence conditions for this type of model are likely to hold. Subsets of the 
attributes are preferentially independent of the complementary subsets and the attribute value functions can be determined independently from one 
another. By intuition, this is because the objectives of cost efficiency, distance to structural elements and biodiversity levels are well-defined and 
independent and it is not plausible that e.g. the preference for a low cost plot changes with variation in the level of biodiversity. Note that preference 
independence does not call for statistical independence. The indicator function, φi, can then determine that all parcels, e.g., above a given threshold 
are eligible. 
Appendix B. Appendix 
Sensitivity analysis of regression results with increasing number of considered neighbours. A) Intensity; B) Farm size; C) Distance Farm –Parcel; D) 
Parcel slope; E) Parcel Size and F) Biodiversity promotion areas in the neighbourhood. y-axes show the average marginal effect and the standard error 
of the corresponding factor on the likelihood of being enrolled in the agglomeration bonus scheme. x-axes represent a k-nearest neighbour matrix with 
k = 1,2,…20. k = 1 implies that each parcel needs to be adjacent to a parcel that is already enrolled in an agri-environmental scheme. This, however, is 
neither prescribed in the scheme nor a useful specification of the neighbourhood matrix. The estimates remain robust with increasing values for k.
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Fig. B.1. Average marginal effect of independent variables with increasing number of neighbours.  
Appendix C. Supplementary Data 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107064. 
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